The bottom line remains that employers will have little motivation to hire low-skilled workers—those whose inexperience and lack of productivity does not warrant a wage meeting or exceeding the proposed living wage amount. These workers, who most desperately need experience, will be the ones left most vulnerable. Instead of being able to establish a foothold in the job market, they will have to rely on other means to provide for themselves—most often state-assisted.
The increased cost of labor is folded into a bid for a state contract that is then passed on to the state government (which is funded by taxpayers).
Most troubling, though, is the fact that the least skilled employees are those who are being most hurt by this ordinance. Voters in other areas considering an increase in the minimum wage must consider these unintended consequences that end up hurting those who the law is supposed to help.
Any way you slice it, increasing the minimum wage in Michigan… is likely to make it more difficult for the working poor to find jobs. …those who most need the work will have a harder time finding it.
[RGGI is] regulation without representation.
Greens have red underbellies. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, communists needed to find a new vocation, so they embraced environmental issues.
[Companies covered by RGGI] will be placed at a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis their non-RGGI competitors (domestic as well as international).
Nonetheless, if the goal of the Coastal Zone Minimum Wage is to help low-income workers in Santa Monica, the Ordinance is worse than useless. The direct benefits of the Ordinance are more poorly targeted than in any social welfare legislation we have ever studied.
Facing a possibility of 20 years in jail and $5 million fines, executives are going to spend lots of time going over financial statements, and less time creating, innovating and leading,”
The subprime mortgage market, which makes funds available to borrowers with impaired credit or little or no credit history, offers a good example of competition at work…To the contrary, it was lenders in the control group that refocused their efforts in line with the mid-1990s boom in lending in low-income neighborhoods. In fact, lending in low-income neighborhoods grew faster than other types of lending at institutions not covered by CRA, whereas low-income lending grew at the same rate as other types of lending activity for CRA-covered lenders. As a group, lenders not covered by CRA devoted a growing proportion of their home-purchase lending to low-income communities, with the community lending share of their loan portfolios rising from 11 percent in 1993 to 14.3 percent in 1997. In contrast, CRA-covered lenders, as a group, devoted about the same proportion of their home-purchase loans to low-income neighborhoods in 1997 as they did in 1993. In both years, their community-lending share was about 11.5 percent. Even though those institutions were subject to CRA, their lending in low-income communities grew no faster than other lending. Those results would not be expected if CRA were the impetus for increases in lending in low-income neighborhoods. The data, however, are consistent with deregulation and technological advances leading to lower information costs and increased competition in the mortgage market. Independent mortgage companies tend to have more leeway to specialize in relatively risky lending than their more conservative and more heavily regulated counterparts in the banking industry. It is not surprising, then, that independent companies took the lead in focusing on lending activity in the riskier segments of the mortgage market… The inescapable conclusion is that progress predicated on technology, financial innovation, and competition—not CRA—has broadened the U.S. financial services marketplace.